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More than 4 percent of workers in the United States are in some 
form of alternative employment arrangement. Most large businesses 
now have a permanent budget category for temporary workers (CPA 
Journal 1998). 
Evidence suggests that employer demand—not labor supply—is 
driving contingent work. Firms apparently want the cost savings and 
fl exibility of hiring workers with no expectation of permanent employ-
ment (Golden 1996; Golden and Applebaum 1992). Companies hired 
more temporary workers as the last two decades progressed, although 
there was not a corresponding increase in workers willing to take con-
tingent jobs (e.g., young people, married women, and older workers). 
In this chapter we explain how forces external to a company op-
erate to increase the demand for a fl exible workforce and summarize 
evidence on how employers use contingent workers to manage labor 
and related costs. We then argue that, in many situations, creating a 
fl exible workforce through investment in permanent employees may 
be a feasible alternative to the use of contingent workers and can be 
expected to lead more readily to a sustainable competitive advantage. 
This argument employs the concept of “real options” to link labor and 
related costs with decision making under uncertain conditions. It then 
combines the real options approach with the resource-based view of the 
fi rm to provide additional insights into the use of fl exible permanent 
employees as a competitive strategy for organizations. This resource-
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based view contends that competitive advantage results from appro-
priately managing resources that are valuable, rare, diffi cult to imitate, 
and combined uniquely within an organization. We also provide sug-
gestions for future research. 
WHY DO EMPLOYERS USE CONTINGENT WORKERS? 
An employer wishing to determine the economic value of any em-
ployee’s contribution compares the costs associated with hiring and em-
ploying a worker relative to the additional production expected (labor 
productivity).1 Firms also need to consider how to plan to achieve the 
fl exibility desired to manage variable and uncertain future economic 
conditions. Distinguishing between ongoing costs and transaction costs 
is important when explaining why employers use contingent workers.
Ongoing Costs: Wages and Benefi ts
Firms may wish to use contingent workers to lower wages or ben-
efi ts. According to the 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS) by the 
U.S. Census Bureau, the median weekly earnings for a full-time, adult 
male contingent worker were only 80 percent of earnings for a com-
parable noncontingent worker. Women in contingent work earned less 
than 72 percent of comparable noncontingent workers. The discrepancy 
holds across all levels of education, age, and race (von Hippel et al. 
1997). Contingent workers are eligible for employer-sponsored health 
insurance or pension coverage less than half as often as noncontingent 
workers (pp. 20–23). Efforts by temporary employees to demand bet-
ter pay and benefi ts—such as lawsuits fi led by oil fi eld workers against 
ARCO and by independent contractors against Microsoft—highlight 
the differential compensation offered to contingent workers (Eisenberg 
1999; Training 1999).
On average, contingent workers receive lower wages than equiva-
lent, noncontingent employees. Workers employed through temporary 
service agencies (TSAs) make approximately 7.7 percent lower wages 
than long-term employees in similar jobs (Segal and Sullivan 1997). 
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However, according to the 1999 CPS supplemental survey, full-time 
contingent workers in some occupations, such as “precision production, 
craft, and repair” and “construction,” earn nearly the same or higher 
median weekly earnings than noncontingent workers. However, wage 
comparisons may be deceiving because employers pay other costs, such 
as a markup to the TSA or the expenses of a self-employed consultant. 
On the other hand, a TSA could substitute for the employer’s internal 
human resources personnel, so not all of the markup should be attrib-
uted to wages. 
Several published studies support the claim that fi rms use tempo-
rary workers to save on fringe benefi ts.2 The growth of the temporary 
help supply industry is positively related to the ratio of quasi-fi xed labor 
costs to variable costs (Golden 1996). Quasi-fi xed labor costs, such as 
health insurance and pension contributions, are associated with a par-
ticular worker rather than with hours worked. At the fi rm level, a higher 
level of benefi ts as a percentage of total payroll is correlated with in-
creased use of temporary agency or call-in employees (Mangum, May-
all, and Nelson 1985). Firms may contract out for services to skirt the 
need to pay all workers the same high rate because of union pay scales 
or because workers believe equal pay is fair.3
Transaction Costs
Unlike wages and benefi ts, many costs associated with employ-
ees are not ongoing. Costs that are incurred each time an agreement 
is formed between two parties are called transaction costs, such as 
time spent interviewing job candidates and processing paperwork, the 
expense of training new employees in fi rm-specifi c skills, the loss of 
goodwill during negotiations, and strategies to protect core workers.
Using temporary employees generally would be expected to in-
crease transaction costs since temporary employees come and go more 
often than permanent workers. Some costs are borne by the human re-
sources budget, such as advertising, conducting interviews, or paying 
for travel. Time spent interviewing applicants can be a substantial in-
vestment for fi rms with high turnover. Another important transaction 
cost is the time and money spent on training new workers, especially 
when a job requires idiosyncratic skills or knowledge. Consequently, 
hiring new workers frequently entails high transaction costs. 
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Also, a less obvious transaction cost is that of continuing to employ 
the same workers under short-term contracts. Most employees develop 
some experience and information that is of more value to the current 
employer than to anyone else. This stock of knowledge, skills, and abil-
ities (called fi rm-specifi c human capital) develops over time. 
Because there is usually some uncertainty surrounding the particu-
lar tasks the worker should do, human capital often develops in ways 
that are not specifi ed in the original employment contract. Thus, at the 
end of a short-term contract, the employee may wish to renegotiate the 
terms of employment to refl ect his or her new perceived value to the 
fi rm. Likewise, the employer may argue that the worker cannot trans-
fer that fi rm-specifi c human capital to another company and should be 
satisfi ed with remuneration that only refl ects what the market will pay 
for generic skills, regardless of the fact that the employee truly can add 
value to the current fi rm. Even if the employer and worker agree to split 
the value created, refl ected in some small raise at the time of renego-
tiation, the time spent in the negotiation process and the potential for 
hard feelings and loss of goodwill impose real costs on both parties. 
Consequently, rather than renegotiate every time the situation changes, 
an employer often will prefer to sign the worker to a long-term employ-
ment contract. The long-term contract gives the employer the right to 
alter the worker’s use of the knowledge or skill as necessary to respond 
to unanticipated changes; it also protects the worker from an employer 
using bargaining power to renegotiate rewards downward. Particularly 
when a job requires substantial fi rm-specifi c training, the employer will 
prefer to hire permanent workers, even if it has to keep them on during 
slack periods when productivity is low (Williamson 1985).
The amount of fi rm-specifi c training may be decreasing as standard 
tools such as computer software make fi rms’ processes more similar 
(Szabo and Negyesi 2005). If so, temporary and contract agencies may 
have an economy of scale in training workers. For example, Manpower 
Inc. introduced a Web-based learning center (www.manpowernet.com), 
which allows its employees and applicants access to technical training 
material. The free information technology training is particularly at-
tractive to people trying to enter computer fi elds, precisely the level of 
workers Manpower typically places, but it also benefi ts Manpower’s 
own full-time employees. Manpower’s knowledge of clients and work-
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ers allows it to track which skills are most in demand. Delivery of train-
ing over the Internet is ideal for technology workers (Cole-Gomolski 
1999). Even in professions with more stable skill requirements, tem-
porary employment agencies may have the opportunity to train more 
workers in a given profession than most businesses. Client fi rms may 
be willing to give up some of their fi rm-specifi c training preferences to 
hire temps with strong generic skills. (See Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 
[1996]. The authors cite examples of how fl exible business strategies 
match well with outside development of employee competencies.)
On the other hand, if workers receive minimal training, the key 
transaction cost surrounding employment may be the bureaucratic sys-
tem of the employer. For a fi rm using generic labor in a seasonal busi-
ness, the administrative and legal costs of hiring and fi ring temporary 
workers can be prohibitive. Furthermore, the legal doctrine of “employ-
ment-at-will,” which allows an employer to dismiss an employee for 
almost any reason, has been weakened by federal regulation, thereby 
increasing the cost of fi ring a permanent worker (Lee 1996).4 In this 
case, the transaction costs associated with contingent workers are less 
than those associated with permanent workers. Moreover, a temporary 
agency has an economy of scale in processing workers. John Bowmer, 
CEO of TSA Adecco, cites the fi rm’s move to acquire Olsten’s staffi ng 
unit as a response to the importance of information technology, which 
makes size important (Studer and Stern 1999). Larger TSAs can spread 
the costs of central computers and software over more placements. Ad-
ecco pioneered interactive “Job Shop” kiosks in public areas, linked 
to the Internet via Monster.com (Sunoo 1999). Such efforts reduce the 
transaction costs related to contingent workers.
Another kind of transaction cost relates to the fi rm’s reputation with 
its core workers. The more frequent the layoffs, the more workers that 
the fi rm hopes to keep will look elsewhere for employment. By clearly 
identifying some jobs as temporary, fi rms can buffer their core workers 
from layoffs. The resulting loyalty of key employees can offset minor 
productivity losses that come from using day laborers or other contin-
gent workers.5 Respondents to a minisurvey from Compensation and 
Benefi ts Review noted that temporary workers allow the respondents’ 
companies to cover the work performed by full-time workers when they 
take time off or to complete special projects (Jefferson and Bohl 1998). 
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The alternatives—requiring other employees to work overtime when 
someone goes on sick leave, or hiring extra programmers with no prom-
ise to recognize seniority after the project is over—would be more det-
rimental to the fi rm’s core workers. For example, Bell Atlantic used an 
interim marketing staff for its move into the long-distance marketplace. 
If the venture failed, no long-term Bell Atlantic Corp. employees would 
be affected. If the market opened up, the company could transfer or hire 
permanent employees to handle the increased work (Keenan 1999). 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON TRANSACTION COSTS
Empirical research supports the importance of transaction costs in 
the management of hiring decisions. Research has investigated how 
fi rms respond to temporary increases in workload, the role of fi rm-spe-
cifi c training, and the impact of bureaucracy and fi rm size. 
A nationwide survey of employers in the early 1980s, as well as 
archival and interview data, showed how different kinds of employ-
ers respond to temporary increases in workload (Mangum, Mayall, and 
Nelson 1985). In general, the researchers conclude that the use of tem-
porary agencies lowered transaction costs related to temporary work-
ers by eliminating various employer costs for a fi xed fee paid to the 
agency, fulfi lling an economic role similar to the union hiring hall. The 
study fi nds that the use of temporary employees from an agency, “call-
ins” (occasional workers on a list maintained by the company itself), or 
“limited duration hires” (day workers or others whose employment is 
for a brief, specifi c time) is more likely when 
• a fi rm has a high level of benefi ts (not true for call-ins),
• the fi rm’s employment level is changing,
• the fi rm is large, or
• the skills involved are less specialized.
Another study using employer survey responses defi nes transaction 
costs primarily in terms of fi rm-specifi c training (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 
1993). In general, the fi ndings support the hypotheses that, in addition 
to employment costs and external economic forces, skill requirements, 
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organizational size, and bureaucratization affect the use of temporary 
workers, leased workers, and independent contractors. When a job re-
quires training, the position is less likely, albeit slightly, to be “external-
ized” (fi lled by someone not on the permanent payroll). The effect is 
statistically signifi cant but extremely modest. A job that involved over 
seven months of training was only one-half of 1 percent less likely to 
be externalized than a job that required no fi rm-specifi c training. This 
result argues against transaction costs being the driving factor in the 
decision. On the other hand, this measure actually includes all hours of 
formal training, informal training by managers, and informal training 
by co-workers for the typical incumbent in that job. It refl ects at least 
some industry-specifi c training and possibly occupational training as 
well. Only some of this training is truly fi rm-specifi c, so this measure 
may underestimate the true impact of this type of training. Also, since 
the survey asked managers to consider the last position they fi lled, there 
is a selection bias toward hard-to-fi ll jobs. In order to fi ll a diffi cult 
position, fi rms may be more likely to hire a worker who lacks prior 
training.
In the same study, the authors measure the amount of paperwork 
necessary to fi re an employee at each fi rm. The assumption is that some 
fi rms are more bureaucratic than others. Based on the argument in the 
previous section, one might predict that the administrative costs in a 
bureaucratic organization would create more demand for temporary 
workers. However, the hypothesis here is that workers undergo a par-
ticular kind of fi rm-specifi c training in a highly bureaucratic fi rm: the 
orientation to the bureaucratic system. Since temporary workers may be 
less able to follow rules without direct management, bureaucratic fi rms 
should use fewer temporary workers. 
Firms with more employees tend to have more bureaucracy and 
can avoid layoffs in any business unit more easily by spreading jobs 
around. Therefore, the hypothesis is that fi rm size should vary inversely 
with the use of temporary workers. In contrast, contract workers gen-
erally manage themselves apart from the rules of the host fi rm. Since 
the diversifi ed fi rm may need access to specialized skills occasionally, 
it should be more likely to use contract workers. As predicted, larger 
fi rms and those with higher levels of bureaucracy are less likely to hire 
temporary workers and more likely to use contract workers. Apparently, 
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the transaction costs of actually hiring and fi ring are outweighed by the 
transaction costs of orienting an employee to a bureaucratic organiza-
tion.
The disadvantage of having temporary employees on site who have 
diffi culty following rules is a cost of integration, even though the inte-
gration is only temporary. The same dynamic can work with contract 
workers in certain settings. For example, contract employees in the pet-
rochemical industry have less safety training than permanent workers 
(Kochan et al. 1994). Since the contract company supervises their em-
ployees, the host fi rm reduces its transaction costs. However, the host 
fi rm and its employees may be harmed if the safety problems caused by 
contract workers go beyond accidents that injure contract employees. 
Thus, it may be in the best interest of the host company to offer further 
safety training and oversight to contract employees to avoid accidents. 
This effectively increases the transaction costs associated with contract 
employees, which may still be outweighed by the transaction costs as-
sociated with hiring and fi ring permanent employees. 
PRODUCTIVITY
From the employer’s perspective, the decision to defi ne a task as 
contingent work or noncontingent work employs a standard cost-ben-
efi t analysis. The value of the expected contribution from either type of 
employee is productivity minus costs. Thus, if contingent workers are 
just as productive at a certain task as permanent employees, fi rms will 
hire contingent workers if the total cost is less. The total cost includes 
both ongoing and transaction costs. That is, 
Value created = Productivity – Total cost
Total cost = Ongoing costs + Transaction costs.
In the same job over the same duration, contingent workers may 
be slightly more or less productive than noncontingent workers. Most 
academic research on direct productivity comparisons has studied en-
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try-level employees because their tasks are generally the same across 
fi rms and settings. For instance, two case studies of data entry operators 
found that the productivity of part-time contingent workers was at least 
7 percent below that of core workers. Considering the relative wages, 
benefi ts, and training costs, the use of contingent employees did not 
seem to be cost effective, but the use of agency-provided temporaries 
did provide savings. The biggest difference between the two categories 
of contingent workers was that the agency temps required much less 
training (Nollen and Axel 1996). Contingent workers in professional 
and technical fi elds, such as independent contractors of engineering 
services, may be at least as productive as a fi rm’s own workers (see 
Jarmon, Paulson, and Rebne [1998]. A survey of managers in six high-
technology settings found that the perceived performance of contrac-
tors was similar to employees). 
Thus, the relative productivity of contingent and permanent em-
ployees depends on the circumstances. If an organization implements a 
new data entry system using off-the-shelf software, agency temps who 
have used the package at other establishments may be more effi cient 
and accurate than the company’s own workers who are just learning the 
system. Regarding professional workers, hiring an attorney who spe-
cializes in the particular legal issues currently facing the fi rm may be 
preferable to keeping one attorney on retainer who is a generalist. It 
may be impossible to hire permanent workers who are able to handle 
every contingency or to pay them full time when the work is seasonal.
Returning to the Bell Atlantic example, another reason the compa-
ny decided to outsource may have been to access marketing people with 
skills related to the specifi c market or project. Many self-employed, 
independent contractors offer specialized expertise that employers need 
only on occasion. An extreme example is the U.S. Census Bureau, 
which hires thousands of workers for each decennial census (Potok and 
Holdrege 1999). The contingent work arrangement can provide an em-
ployer with fl exibility to maintain high productivity, even when circum-
stances change. 
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USING “REAL OPTIONS” TO EXPLAIN 
FLEXIBILITY PLANNING
A fl exible workforce is one that can create value under various con-
ditions of production. There are two ways to achieve a workforce that 
can adapt over time to perform different tasks. One way is to hire dif-
ferent workers over time through contingent arrangements, including 
hiring into the fi rm with no long-term commitment. The other way is 
to hire and develop fl exible permanent employees with either a broad 
range of skills or the ability and willingness to learn and adapt with the 
organization over time. In terms of the value equation above, a simple 
approach is:
Productivity =  (Productivity under one condition × Probability of 
 that condition) 
                     + (Productivity under another condition × Probability  
 of that other condition). 
If there are only a few possible conditions, and if an employer can 
anticipate their probabilities accurately, then it is possible to write those 
expectations into an employment contract. However, as the variety of 
potential tasks increases or the business environment becomes more un-
predictable, it becomes impossible to work out every possible scenario 
ahead of time. Then, fl exibility is helpful not only because productivity 
is increased under various conditions, but also because negotiations are 
simplifi ed. Uncertainty, not just variability, makes fl exibility valuable. 
But how does one estimate the value of fl exibility?
Mathematically, the employer can estimate probabilities and con-
duct a more complete cost-benefi t analysis than discussed above. Theo-
retically, one could even generate expected cash fl ows resulting from 
the worker’s contribution. Standard fi nancial analysis would use those 
cash fl ows discounted appropriately over time to produce a measure 
of net present value (NPV). Of course, realized cash fl ows may differ 
substantially from the expectation. Thus, a fi nancial analyst will usually 
check to be sure conclusions do not change substantially if assumptions 
(e.g., the interest rate) change slightly. This “sensitivity analysis” con-
siders not only the mean of the distribution of potential returns, but also 
the variation around the mean. For example, one can use a mathemati-
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cal formula to estimate the value of mineral rights based not only on the 
expected price of the mineral and the costs of extraction, but also the 
possible drift in price in the future (Copeland, Koller, and Murrin 1995, 
Chapter 15). The right to drill for oil can be worth much more than 
might be revealed through a simple NPV analysis, because the owner 
only has to invest in extraction if the price of oil is high. 
Similar logic underlies the large market for fi nancial options. A call 
option, for instance, gives the investor the right to buy a stock at a speci-
fi ed price at a future date. If the stock price drops, the investor loses 
only the initial purchase price of the option, which is usually a few dol-
lars for each share of stock. But if the stock price rises, the investor’s 
gain is potentially huge. The investor can buy the stock at a preset, low 
price and sell at a high price. If the stock price is certain, options do not 
matter much; but if a stock price varies widely, an option is highly valu-
able.6 The value of the option comes from the fact that the investor will 
only exercise the right to buy the stock if circumstances are favorable.7 
The prevalence of fi nancial options has led fi nancial analysts to ap-
ply the term “option” to other kinds of investment under uncertainty. 
For example, the right to drill for oil is considered a “real option.” The 
term “real” comes from the fact that this option involves investment in 
a real asset such as real estate rather than a fi nancial asset such as stock. 
Also, the additional value not captured in the simple NPV calculation is 
sometimes called the “option value.” 
A real option usually will be refl ected in a series of small, staged 
investments rather than a single, large investment, which is aimed at the 
same goal but is less fl exible.8 For example, fi rms entering highly un-
certain new markets appear to invest in joint ventures rather than whol-
ly owned subsidiaries because a joint venture embodies an option (Chi 
and McGuire 1996; Kogut 1991). For a relatively small investment, 
the fi rm can 1) learn more about the market and its potential partners, 
2) wait to see if the market develops in some unpredictable manner, 
and 3) get out of the deal if necessary without damaging its reputation. 
The essential characteristic of a real option is that it allows the owner 
to make a claim when conditions are favorable, with limited downside 
risk. When change is likely but its direction is unpredictable, the fi rm 
may have different requirements than if the current environment is ex-
pected to continue. 
76   Miller and Barney
Hiring temporary workers is a type of real option because the em-
ployer can switch labor inputs as conditions fl uctuate (Foote and Folta 
2002). While this arrangement does not have a written purchase price 
or exercise period, there are parallels to fi nancial options. The purchase 
price of the real option may be lower productivity, higher transaction 
costs, or even higher wages. The option may only be good for a certain 
period, either because temporary workers can be expected to move on 
to other employers more likely to offer permanent positions, or because 
government regulation prevents keeping workers contingent forever. 
Transaction costs incurred in switching from one set of contingent 
workers to another, such as the cost of fi rm-specifi c training, represent 
a price paid when the option is exercised. Using real options logic in 
the employment context does not negate the importance of costs, but 
it allows consideration of fl exibility as well. Therefore, under high un-
certainty, the option value may fl ip the decision from hiring infl exible 
permanent workers to hiring contingent workers. 
On the other hand, investing in full-time employees can create a 
different real option in which the fi rm secures the right to ask the em-
ployee to vary activities. The purchase price is the cost of inducing the 
employee to develop fi rm-specifi c human capital, perhaps through a 
company-sponsored training program. The exercise period depends on 
the outside job market as well as the person’s age and ability to learn. 
There may be some further cost to exercise the right. For example, the 
manager may have to give some attention to restructuring work rela-
tionships, and the employee may not be at optimal productivity in the 
new setting right away. Both of these real options hedge against the 
same kinds of risks, and the value of both increases with higher uncer-
tainty. Of course, just as there are different kinds of transaction costs, 
there also are many kinds of uncertainty to consider. 
Factors Creating Uncertainty
There are three important categories of uncertainty: demand, tech-
nological, and measurement. Any change in demand can increase or re-
duce the number of labor hours (and therefore workers) a fi rm requires. 
These changes can result from shifts in buying power, consumer prefer-
ences, competition, or other factors. Moreover, cyclicality of consumer 
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demand can lead to increased demand for temporary workers, even if 
that cyclicality is perfectly predictable, as in the case of the decennial 
census of the United States. Given uncertainty about demand, a fi rm 
would prefer to collect more information and wait before hiring perma-
nent employees. The greater the degree of the uncertainty, the more ten-
uous the desired commitments to employees become. If it were costless 
to hire and fi re permanent employees, dishonest managers might offer 
“permanent” jobs when needed, and simply lay off people to match 
fl uctuating demand. However, the costs of such actions include the loss 
of company reputation and the breakdown of the internal labor market 
(e.g., people performing their best to get a promotion). 
In fact, the specifi c type of job infl uences the response to demand 
uncertainty, according to a study of contract services (Abraham and 
Taylor 1996, pp. 411–412). Organizations in industries with seasonal or 
cyclical workloads contract out signifi cantly less of their janitorial and 
machine maintenance work. Cyclical fi rms also seem to contract out 
fewer engineering and drafting services, but more of their accounting 
work. The researchers offer a caveat that they had to construct season-
ality and cyclicality measures from employment data at the industry 
level since they did not have access to that information for each estab-
lishment. A different study used establishment-level data to construct 
a measure of employment variability over a two-year span prior to the 
survey. This measure, which blends seasonality, cyclicality, and trend 
effects, is positively related to the use of temporary workers, as ex-
pected, confi rming the value of fl exibility under variability in demand 
(Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993, p. 207).9 
Similarly, if a fi rm is uncertain about what technology will be the 
most effi cient, it will be diffi cult to specify what tasks employees will 
do in the future. The greater the degree of technological uncertainty, 
the more problematic it is to commit to a group of employees with set 
skills. Any change that affects the labor supply—equipment purchas-
es, worker education, job process reengineering, or other factors that 
change the productivity of labor or the specifi c skills required to best 
implement production—can impact not only what tasks a worker per-
forms, but also what that worker must be able to learn. A computer soft-
ware designer can probably learn another programming tool. However, 
a company that moves from a business plan based on lean production to 
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one based on customer service may desire employee competencies that 
were not required previously.
Measurement uncertainty arises because an employee’s productiv-
ity in any specifi c task is never fully verifi able. The resulting possi-
bility of shirking work or other opportunistic behavior creates agency 
costs. Either the employer has to pay for someone to monitor the em-
ployee, the employee has to pay (perhaps in the form of self-fi nanced 
education) to give assurance he can do the job, or the employer has 
to be willing to live with the potential losses. These agency costs are 
primarily characteristic of the task, not the employee. Some jobs are 
more diffi cult to monitor. Therefore, it is diffi cult to predict the impact 
of measurement uncertainty on the use of contingent workers. A per-
manent, internal employee may be more trusted, and can be rewarded 
based on long-term performance. On the other hand, using a contract 
worker or leased worker may allow a fi rm to share some of the agency 
risk with the contracting fi rm. A temporary employment agency might 
have an economy of scale or develop a particular skill in monitoring its 
employees or training them to a minimal degree of productivity. Also, 
externalized workers may have less opportunity to shirk duties if their 
assignments are more specifi c. To the extent that employers believe 
workers differ in their propensity to be opportunistic (and vice versa), 
temporary employment can be an effective screening device prior to a 
permanent hire. 
To summarize, real option theory generally would propose that, 
under high uncertainty, companies should desire a more fl exible work-
force than required under low uncertainty. Flexibility can be achieved 
in two ways. One way is to employ more fl exible permanent employees. 
In the face of demand uncertainty, companies will want to hire workers 
who will accept overtime hours and pay. If technological uncertainty 
makes it impossible to fully defi ne the skills required in an employee, 
companies should aim to recruit employees with multiple competen-
cies. The increased value of the fl exible permanent workers would then 
require higher overall compensation. Moreover, the transaction costs 
and agency costs associated with fl exible employees would likely be 
higher than for focused employees, but the value of their productivity 
under various scenarios will outweigh the increased costs as uncertainty 
increases. The fi rm will only invest in such human capital if it can re-
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tain the right to exercise the option at its discretion. Thus, these fl exible 
employees should be bound with contractual agreements that protect 
the fi rm’s options, such as long-term contracts and “do not compete” 
clauses. 
Alternatively, fi rms could achieve fl exibility through the structure 
of the workforce: outsourcing work, or using leased or temporary em-
ployees (Foote and Folta 2002). In the case of demand uncertainty, the 
fi rm can hire temporary employees as needed. When technological un-
certainty is high, the fi rm can hire contingent workers with different skill 
sets, and hire permanently only those it needs. Or, the fi rm can hire the 
workers it needs today and replace them in the future with workers with 
other skills. As technological uncertainty increases to very high levels, 
it would be impossible to hire permanent workers with the ability or de-
sire to learn every possible skill required. The fl exibility inherent in any 
one person is limited. When measurement uncertainty is present, fi rms 
may use temporary employment as a screening device. Firms can learn 
about specifi c employees and reduce the uncertainty involved in offers 
of permanent employment.10 For example, the company could put tem-
porary workers through a brief training program to see which are best 
suited to the company. Furthermore, certain fi rms may be able to hire 
these workers permanently at wages lower than for employees who did 
not temp fi rst, because the temporary relationship convinced the worker 
that the company is a good place to work. The permanent hiring of 
temporary workers depends on the uncertainty being resolvable. In the 
extreme, hypercompetitive environment, a fi rm will desire to maintain 
the contingent relationship so it can swap skill sets as needed. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
Existing research has tested for the importance of various deter-
minants of demand for contingent labor. Unfortunately, studies to date 
have typically focused on one type of contingent work, or have mea-
sured only whether a form of contingent work is used at all, not the 
extent to which it is used. Gathering data on wages, benefi ts, transaction 
costs, and productivity for the same set of workers has been diffi cult. 
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However, to distinguish the economic importance of the various fac-
tors, they must all be included in the same statistical model.11 The bien-
nial supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) on contingent 
work offer an initial approach to these issues using a large sample of 
workers. We offer the following analysis of these data to confi rm gen-
eral facts and to point to issues deserving more rigorous research. 
The February 1995 supplement to the CPS was the fi rst to focus 
on contingent workers, whom Polivka and Nardone (1989) defi ne as 
“workers who have no implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employ-
ment.” The survey pertained to the worker’s length of expected service 
as well as work arrangement. Respondents are categorized as contin-
gent according to three defi nitions and their associated employment es-
timates. Estimate 1 includes wage and salary workers who have been in 
their jobs for up to one year and expect their jobs to last no more than an 
additional year. Estimate 2 includes those workers plus self-employed 
or independent contractors whose length of service matches defi nition 
1. Estimate 3 includes wage and salary workers who believe their jobs 
to be temporary, without a specifi c time frame, plus all self-employed 
and independent contractors.12 Thus, a worker is not defi ned as con-
tingent simply because he or she works for a temporary agency, for 
example. Temporary agencies have permanent employees, and some 
fi rms that hire from temporary agencies also maintain their own pools 
of on-call workers. Using defi nition 3, 66.5 percent of workers paid 
by temporary help agencies in 1995 were contingent workers, and 3.6 
percent of workers in traditional arrangements were contingent workers 
(Cohany 1996). 
Each estimate refl ects worker responses rather than a formal de-
scription by a human resources person at the company. It captures all 
employment arrangements in which contingency is understood even 
if not recorded in a written contract. Moreover, it refl ects all differ-
ent kinds of contingent relationships, which is important since these 
relationships can be substitutes for each other. The percentages of each 
estimate have remained similar in subsequent surveys.13 Thus, 400,000 
workers employed by temporary agencies see their positions lasting as 
long as they wish, while nearly 4 million workers employed directly by 
a fi rm consider their jobs more or less temporary. 
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Our analysis of data on 2,568 workers answering the 1995 CPS 
supplement reveals several important determinants in the choice of the 
relative importance of contingent and noncontingent jobs in the em-
ployment structure.14 The model presented here assumes managers go 
to the labor market and identify prospective employees who are will-
ing to accept a given level of compensation for their skills, experience, 
and education. Managers then choose whether to offer a contingent or 
noncontingent position based on the costs and benefi ts associated with 
those workers available to fi ll each kind of position.15 This is a model 
of labor demand, not supply, so no conclusions should be drawn re-
garding workers’ choices of positions. Furthermore, this model con-
tains no information on worker productivity. The implicit assumption is 
that contingent workers and noncontingent workers perform the same. 
These simplifying assumptions are clearly unrealistic to some extent, 
and make the results given in this section exploratory. However, clari-
fying the assumptions also can help identify what kind of data would 
better untangle the interrelationships between factors. 
All data in the discussion that follows are based on Estimate 1. 
Results are similar for the other defi nitions of contingency, except the 
impact of fringe benefi ts decreases when self-employed workers are 
included in the contingent ranks. The evidence shows the importance of 
ongoing costs, transaction costs, and fl exibility in the decision to make 
a position contingent. 
The current legal and cultural environment allows fi rms to offer, on 
average, lower wages and fewer benefi ts to contingent workers than to 
permanent workers. Our evidence confi rms previous fi ndings that em-
ployers hire contingent workers to reduce ongoing costs. The higher the 
level of weekly pay, the less likely a worker is contingent. Furthermore, 
if the employer provides health insurance or a pension in conjunction 
with the job, the worker is less likely to be contingent. 
The CPS supplement did not ask about hours of training or other in-
dicators of transaction costs. No information is given on the employer, 
other than the industry. However, if temporary agencies and contracting 
fi rms reduce transaction costs through economies of scale in processing 
and training workers, then fi rms should hire more contingent workers 
when these agencies are available and can achieve economies of scale. 
Thus, jobs in metropolitan areas should be more likely to be fi lled by 
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contingent workers. The CPS identifi es the worker by census tract into 
three categories: central city, nonmetropolitan, and other (e.g., subur-
ban). Indeed, we fi nd that workers in nonmetropolitan areas are 2.59 
percent less likely to be contingent than workers in other areas. 
Firms can achieve workforce fl exibility either through more fl ex-
ible permanent employees or through the use of specialized, contin-
gent workers. More fl exible workers will therefore be less likely to be 
contingent employees. Age, education, and willingness to work non-
traditional hours may all relate to worker fl exibility. First, older work-
ers have had more time to acquire a range of knowledge, skills, and 
abilities, including human capital specifi c to the fi rm. From the supply 
side, older workers also should be less willing to enter some contingent 
arrangements (such as temporary work) because their expected return 
on additional investments in human capital, such as learning new skills 
or acquiring new fi rm-specifi c knowledge, is limited by the time period 
available to benefi t from the return. On the other hand, older work-
ers may be more willing to be self-employed to take full advantage of 
their experience or take part-time jobs to enjoy more leisure. Second, 
a worker with more schooling should be more capable of learning new 
tasks, so we control for education level. Third, workers who work more 
than 40 hours a week provide a buffer against demand variation and 
uncertainty. However, part-time workers may be a substitute for contin-
gent workers as defi ned in the CPS supplement. Firms may use workers 
for fewer hours each week on a permanent basis, rather than hiring full-
time workers for short durations. 
Including age in the model lessens the effect of pay, which makes 
sense since a worker’s earnings usually increase throughout his or her 
career. A change in age from 30 to 40 reduces the probability that a 
worker is contingent by 5.7 percent. However, education does not seem 
to make a difference. Considering raw correlation statistics, having a 
bachelor’s or graduate degree appears to be negatively related to contin-
gent status. However, in a full model including the other factors, educa-
tion has no effect.16 The more overtime hours a person works, the more 
likely he or she is to be a permanent employee of the fi rm. Part-time 
status has no effect after controlling for wage and other variables. 
Finally, fi rms facing higher uncertainty or variability should be 
more likely to hire contingent employees than fi rms facing lower uncer-
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tainty. Since fi rm-level data are not available due to privacy concerns, 
an industry-level measure is used. This measure is the mean variation 
in stock returns over a two-year period for each three-digit SIC code, 
matched to the industry codes used in the CPS. Only industries with at 
least fi ve actively traded fi rms were included. Aggregating over the in-
dustry creates a proxy for changes that affect total demand and the tech-
nology shared by the members of that industry.17 We fi nd that industry-
level variability has no bearing on the use of contingent workers. It may 
be that the option value is more closely tied to fi rm-level uncertainty, or 
that achieving fl exibility through investment in permanent workers is a 
close substitute for hiring temporary workers. 
Overall, contingent positions pay less in wages, offer health insur-
ance and pension coverage less often, and are more likely to be located 
in a city and not in a rural area. Contingent positions are less likely to 
be fi lled by older workers and those who worked overtime hours in the 
previous week. These broad correlations reinforce the tabulated results 
released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH A 
FLEXIBLE WORKFORCE
As explained above, employees add value to an organization, and 
this value varies according to different conditions. We have argued that 
fi rms desire a workforce that can adapt quickly and effectively, espe-
cially as the pace of change in technology, international competition, 
and other dynamic environmental forces require increased fl exibility. 
Furthermore, the employer can adjust the mix of contingent work ar-
rangements and fl exible permanent employees to address demand, tech-
nological, and measurement uncertainties. These two means of achiev-
ing fl exibility can often substitute for each other. The key to gaining a 
competitive advantage is whether one fi rm can achieve fl exibility that 
competitors cannot. Employers pursue strategic human resource man-
agement (SHRM) to compete effectively in these uncertain conditions. 
The primary theoretical perspective being used in studies of SHRM is 
the resource-based view of the fi rm.18 In this approach, an organization 
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gains competitive advantage from managing resources that are valu-
able, rare, diffi cult to imitate, and organizationally implemented (Bar-
ney 1991; 1997, Chapter 5). 
A resource or capability has value to the extent that it enables the 
fi rm to cut costs, increase price, or otherwise allow the fi rm to pursue a 
strategy in product markets. A resource or capability is rare when only 
one or a few competitors employ it in their strategies. Standard micro-
economic approaches usually assume that competitors all have access 
to the same resources and will adjust prices or quantities until the earn-
ings from the resource are just enough to cover the risk involved in its 
purchase. However, this “perfect competition” rarely, if ever, occurs. 
Some industries or geographic markets have only a few participating 
companies and, in emerging markets, a fi rst mover may be able to gain 
high returns on its product while competitors try to catch up. Therefore, 
ongoing rarity is a function of how diffi cult a resource or capability is 
to imitate. 
One reason a competitor may not be able to imitate a resource is 
that it was acquired at a unique point in history that cannot be repeated. 
For example, pharmaceutical companies that already valued basic sci-
ence research in the 1970s were able to adopt new “science-driven” 
drug discovery procedures that led to highly profi table blockbuster 
drugs, whereas those companies that had relied on more random testing 
of existing chemicals to solve medical problems were unable to hire 
the scientists and create the culture needed to imitate them (Cockburn, 
Henderson, and Stern 2000). 
A second obstacle to imitation is that someone outside the organi-
zation may not be able to distinguish the resource that is making the 
difference. Even if the competitor knows which capability to imitate, 
it may be hard to achieve since value is often created by teams of peo-
ple working together in ways that are diffi cult to manage. Of course, 
those same management struggles affect the fi rm that already has the 
resource, so creating and maintaining an organization to get the best out 
of the resources is the fi nal condition for competitive advantage. We 
now apply these concepts to the case of a fl exible permanent workforce, 
with an emphasis on the issue of imitation. 
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The Flexible Permanent Workforce
For several reasons, a fl exible permanent workforce built from 
training and rewarding permanent employees will be more diffi cult to 
imitate than a fl exible workforce using contingent workers. First, cre-
ating a fl exible permanent workforce takes time, whereas creating a 
fl exible contingent workforce can be done more quickly, particularly 
with the aid of large-scale temporary service agencies. A permanent 
worker’s fl exibility may increase naturally over time as the employee 
changes jobs within the organization, encounters different customers, 
or communicates with other workers about their jobs. Also, an employ-
ee’s long tenure often includes times when the employee sacrifi ces for 
the benefi t of the fi rm, and other times when the company rewards that 
service by giving the employee extra consideration. The repeated reci-
procity builds trust and encourages the worker to be fl exible again in 
the future. Since knowledge and trust are rooted in a particular history, 
it would be diffi cult for a competitor to quickly reproduce that kind of 
relationship. When a change in demand or technology occurs, the capa-
bilities must be already in place to be effective. In contrast, adjusting the 
workforce with contingent workers happens at the time of the change. 
A competitor can implement the same plan from scratch, assuming the 
purpose of the plan is apparent and does not rely on either reconfi guring 
the physical assets the contingent workers will use or redesigning jobs. 
The second argument for a fl exible permanent workforce is that 
employment policies focused within the fi rm are less transparent to ob-
servers than are relationships with external parties. Temporary service 
agencies, contract agencies, or independent contractors may reveal the 
parameters and proposed benefi ts of their relationship with one fi rm 
to entice another fi rm to use their services. Competitors can even ask 
contingent workers how their previous employers used them. The fl ow 
of information makes the market for contingent workers fairly effi cient: 
any employer should have to pay about the same amount to contract 
for similar services. However, matching cost is not the only aspect of 
benchmarking. Even more important is the issue of whether the re-
source or policy under consideration is central to the fi rm’s success. 
With a relatively minor investment, a competitor can investigate an em-
ployer’s contingent work practices and determine whether they are the 
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source of the fi rm’s competitive advantage or merely a convenient way 
to staff a fi rm that really gains its superiority from other factors besides 
human resources (e.g., its well-known brand name). On the other hand, 
an employer’s relationship with its permanent employees is harder to 
benchmark. A large organization follows complicated selection proce-
dures, conducts numerous training programs, transfers employees be-
tween departments, and offers various incentives. 
Part of what makes human resource systems so hard to understand 
is that they are very complex, involving informal communication and 
relationships. This complexity also makes it diffi cult to duplicate such 
systems, even when the key components are well understood. Competi-
tors thus fi nd it diffi cult to determine which policies and practices have 
the desired effect. It is possible that an employer uses an outside con-
sultant to determine salaries or off-the-shelf software to train personnel. 
In that case, a competitor could use the same methods. However, if the 
key aspect of fi rm-specifi c human capital is something less obvious, 
such as the personal commitments of team members to one another, 
implementing all the standard solutions will be ineffective in matching 
the successful fi rm. For example, HR practices that target employee 
development can speed organizational learning, increase quality, and 
enhance the fl exibility of manufacturing systems.19 So, does a fi rm’s 
manufacturing quality come from its proprietary machinery, used by 
merely competent line workers, or from highly involved workers who 
make constant suggestions for ongoing improvement to the machinery? 
The answer to this question could lead a competitor to invest in new 
equipment, new HR policies, or both.  
The third explanation for why it can be more diffi cult to imitate 
a fl exible permanent workforce than one created through contingent 
workers is that the imitator fi rm’s own history and capabilities impede 
transfer of best practices from elsewhere. A small misunderstanding can 
have a large impact on employees’ loyalty and productivity. Firms must 
select, train, compensate, and commit to employees to create learning 
synergies—just one of those aspects probably is not enough. The diffi -
cult nature of implementing such systems may explain why many fi rms 
do not adopt “high-performance” work systems, and why many of these 
systems die off quickly (Pfeffer 1994). An important aspect of the com-
plexity in workforce fl exibility is the relationship between a plant or di-
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vision and company headquarters. Employees will only welcome some 
practices (e.g., merit pay) if they are universally applied. Likewise, staff 
may establish uniform policies in order to simplify record keeping and 
avoid mistakes. Both pressures will work against the manager of a par-
ticular plant trying to benchmark to a competitor whose practices differ 
from the policies of his parent corporation. However, the harder a strat-
egy is to implement, the more likely the successful fi rms will have a 
source of sustainable advantage. A workforce that creates value through 
fl exibility will remain rare only if there exist barriers to imitation. The 
challenge for managers is to create an organizational structure and cul-
ture that is consistent with the strategy, but not so formal or simple as to 
allow for easy benchmarking.
Combining the Resource-Based and Real Options Frameworks 
We have presented two frameworks for understanding fl exible em-
ployment. Real options help managers know under what conditions 
fl exibility is important for any organization. The real option approach 
also explains why contingent workers and fl exible permanent employ-
ees are substitute methods of creating value under uncertainty. The re-
source-based view clarifi es that gaining fl exibility through permanent 
employees is more likely to sustain that value in the face of competition. 
Bringing the two frameworks together can generate some additional 
insights into how managers can use real options to gain competitive ad-
vantage. The resource-based descriptions of markets, uncertainty, and 
competitive advantage fi t well with the type of economic framework 
represented by fi nancial options and real options. Three keys to the use 
of fi nancial options are information, complementarity, and effi ciency, 
and the same aspects exist for the real option of a fl exible workforce. 
Financial investors trade stocks based on information about the 
magnitude, timing, and direction of profi ts and price movements. Fi-
nancial options can be a less expensive way to profi t from stock price 
movement. For the price of one share of stock, an investor could pur-
chase dozens of options that will also appreciate if the stock goes up. It 
is even possible to make money on fi nancial options solely by having 
superior information about the amount of variability a stock’s price will 
exhibit over time. For example, a certain combination of call options 
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and put options may gain value if the stock price begins to move more 
erratically over time. An investor does not need to know whether the 
stock is going up or down, just whether world events or other factors 
will cause the company’s cash fl ows to be less predictable in the future. 
Likewise, purchasing and exercising real options can lead to competi-
tive advantage if a fi rm has superior information. 
Certain kinds of superior information may enable a fi rm to hire em-
ployees at an advantage. Suppose a fi rm has superior information about 
which knowledge and skills will be in greatest demand in the near fu-
ture. Competitors may be recruiting workers with broad skills, perhaps 
paying a premium for intelligence and industry experience. But the fi rm 
with superior information is able to select relatively infl exible workers 
with just the right skills. While other fi rms are paying higher transaction 
costs for churning through contingent workers, this fi rm can hire once. 
Also, the complementarity between fi nancial options and the un-
derlying assets determines the value for each investor. The value of 
fi nancial options depends on the other assets in the investor’s portfolio, 
often because investors use fi nancial options to hedge against exposure 
to specifi c risks. For example, an American company doing business 
in Europe will earn revenues in euros, and will want to hedge against 
changes in the exchange rate of the euro versus the dollar. A purely do-
mestic U.S.-based company would have no need to hedge against cur-
rency risk. Even though traders and companies have sometimes been 
hurt by speculative investment in options, the market for them contin-
ues to be strong because they are a low-cost way to hedge against spe-
cifi c risks. On the individual level, an investor who already owns shares 
of stock can sell call options on those shares to lock in a limited profi t; 
the call option thus serves as a form of insurance. Similarly, different 
real options will be worth more to some companies than others because 
of the uncertainty each faces and the resources under its control. 
A fi rm with a particular resource may fi nd investment in a fl exible 
permanent workforce to be more valuable to it than a similar invest-
ment would be to its competitor. For instance, a fi rm with a distinctive 
culture, brand name, managerial know-how, or location may be able to 
leverage that resource into greater profi ts by hiring more fl exible per-
manent employees at lower cost or with greater productivity than their 
competitors. Consider an organization with superior proprietary tech-
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nology that allows a single worker to coordinate production of multiple 
items. For competitors, the same production requires multiple workers 
supervising multiple machines. The fi rm with the advantage can afford 
to bid more than its competitors for the workers with the best learning 
ability, and still be able to make an abnormal profi t from their efforts. 
The reverse is also possible. A fi rm may use distributed manufacturing 
to meet demand as it arises. Because machines and systems are simple 
or standardized, the company can hire temporary workers for a rela-
tively low cost. A competitor committed to one large production facility 
may have expensive overhead even during downtimes. 
Finally, the U.S. stock market is still highly effi cient in the sense 
that the mechanisms of trade are not costly (e.g., stocks trading in pen-
ny increments) and do not automatically bias prices one way or the 
other. The effi ciency occurs despite the fact that the information avail-
able to investors is sometimes clouded by corporate misinformation 
(e.g., Enron’s off-balance-sheet accounting), and some risks cannot be 
anticipated (e.g., a terrorist attack). On the other hand, the markets for 
resources that create real options are not necessarily effi cient. Firms do 
not frequently trade or sell real options, and managers may discount the 
value of fl exibility if it means trying something new. 
Any input for sale in an effi cient market will not be a likely source 
of competitive advantage. Competing fi rms should bid up the price of 
the resource to its fair market value. The market for contingent work-
ers, at least in large metropolitan areas, is fairly effi cient. Temporary 
service agencies, contract agencies, and independent contractors gener-
ally provide their services at the same price to each employer. Likewise, 
if every potential employer knows that certain potential employees are 
more fl exible, the cost of engaging those workers on a permanent basis 
should rise to a level that equals their value contribution. Many seem-
ingly different job abilities are highly correlated, at least as commonly 
measured (Campion 1989). Entering the market for fl exible employees, 
an organization may fi nd that everyone is its competitor, not just the 
other fi rms in its industry. Thus, although a fl exible permanent work-
force can be achieved through the structure of work and the selection 
of workers, such processes are likely to cost a fi rm the full price of the 
fl exibility. Structure and selection can bring the average fi rm to com-
petitive parity, but not competitive advantage.
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On the other hand, in order to gain or extend a competitive ad-
vantage through investment in permanent employees, a company must 
only have superior information relative to its employees. Companies 
typically have a better understanding of what a job requires than does 
the prospective employee. The difference in information allows the fi rm 
to hire the worker at a fair market price, but less than the full value the 
individual will create within the fi rm over time. Then, continued invest-
ment in fi rm-specifi c human capital can create more value to be shared 
between the employer and an employee. The employee is willing to 
learn from the employer because of the employer’s superior informa-
tion and resources. Even skilled workers who know more about their 
tasks than any manager will fi nd it easier to prove their value to the or-
ganization by listening to how their tasks fi t within the overall strategy, 
rather than trying on their own to unpack complex interactions among 
other workers. The agreement between the employer and employee is 
not an effi cient market, but rather a negotiation, even if it takes place 
within the structure of a union contract. 
This is not to argue that all fi rms would do equally well to invest in 
permanent employees. Managerial skill, teamwork, distinctive reward 
systems, partnerships with universities, or other resources could cre-
ate a superior environment for developing the right kind of employee 
fl exibility. An optimal strategy for any given fi rm may be to invest in 
real options through some permanent employees and some contingent 
workers. Periodically integrating outsiders can invigorate organization-
al learning and facilitate change, even in businesses relying primarily 
on core workers.20 Similarly, fi rms with good reason to employ many 
contingent workers may need to invest in a few key employees who can 
coordinate the constant fl ow of workers. Nevertheless, the resource-
based view clarifi es that a fl exible permanent workforce may be a more 
sustainable source of competitive advantage than a contingent work-
force, and the real options logic highlights the importance of informa-
tion about industry conditions, fi rm-specifi c risks, and how an employee 
can become part of a complex system to create value. 
Employer Perspectives   91
CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
Current research suggests that increasing rates of change in the 
economic environment and uncertainty have driven demand for contin-
gent workers. Temporary supply agencies, independent contractors, and 
other organizational forms have arisen to take advantage of economies 
of scale and reduce transaction costs related to hiring workers with a 
particular, identifi able skill. Contingent work situations are diverse and 
they are designed to address different costs and benefi ts. A multivari-
ate regression analysis using CPS data confi rmed that employers are 
likely to hire contingent workers to save on wages, health insurance, 
and pension contributions, and to take advantage of the availability 
of large-scale agencies located in metropolitan areas. However, more 
fl exible workers, such as those who have had more experience or are 
willing to work overtime, are less likely to be in contingent positions, 
which implies that employers also recognize the possibility of gaining 
a fl exible workforce through hiring and training permanent employees. 
The resource-based view of the fi rm and the real options approach to 
valuing fl exibility clarify that a company relying on multiskilled perma-
nent employees to adapt to change may be in a better position to gain 
and sustain a competitive advantage than a company using contingent 
workers to handle uncertain labor demand. 
Future research should shed light on two main areas. First, what 
are the most important factors driving demand for contingent workers? 
Second, under what circumstances is it preferable to invest in fl exible 
permanent employees rather than using contingent workers? To answer 
both questions, there is a need for research designs that will measure 
all relevant costs and employee productivity. These studies would do 
well to move beyond studies of low-skilled temporary workers to con-
sideration of the kind of high-skilled and professional occupations that 
are more central to value creation in a business. The measurement of 
particular risks in each fi rm’s environment is necessary to test whether 
fi rms create the right real options.
An appropriate case study to address both questions might compare 
two fi rms that face ongoing technology changes, the timing of which 
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is unpredictable. One fi rm might make a commitment to its existing 
full-time workers, promising to train them in any new skill required. 
The other fi rm might cut back to a core of full-time employees and fi ll 
the other positions with temporary workers. When the change occurs 
(e.g., when a new time-saving computer technology is released), the 
fi rst company pays to train its employees and may have to fi re or of-
fer early retirement to some who cannot make the adjustment, but it 
retains people with years of fi rm-specifi c experience. The second fi rm 
can move more quickly to hire temps with the newly required skills, as-
suming they are available in the labor market, or rely on the agency to 
train workers. The company using temporary workers ramps up to full 
productivity more quickly and inexpensively, but perhaps the eventual 
peak productivity is less than at the fi rm using its own employees. After 
the fact, one could assess which fi rm had higher overall productivity. 
But such examples are hard to fi nd. Managers facing the same uncer-
tainty often follow similar strategies, and estimating costs of training, 
turnover, and benefi ts is diffi cult. 
Such research would require detailed personnel data, as well as in-
tegrated theories. The worker’s own assessment of knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and motivation is relevant, as well as the employer’s evalua-
tion of the environment, the fi rm’s strategy, and the worker’s produc-
tivity and costs. Transaction costs are important, but theories also ac-
counting for fi rm-specifi c resources and the need for fl exibility must be 
tailored to specifi c industry and occupational contexts. 
Finally, economy-wide evaluations of supply and demand for con-
tingent work should be replicated at the level of the industry and fi rm. 
The CPS supplements have helped to defi ne contingent work and its im-
pact for the overall economy. However, new data sets at a more detailed 
level would allow tests of models considering worker and employer 
motivations. An understanding of both labor supply and demand is nec-
essary to untangle the multiple factors driving contingent work. 
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Notes
 1. This discussion builds on a review of workforce practices that concludes organi-
zations use temporary employees to cut costs, avoid restrictions/consequences, 
and increase fl exibility. See von Hippel et al. (1997). 
  2.   The exception is a major study of employment externalization fi nding no rela-
tion between likelihood of a job being temporary and the level of fringe benefi ts. 
However, data on fringe benefi ts were only available at the industry level (2-digit 
SIC code), whereas the dependent variable is at the job level. This acknowledged 
mismatch might have diluted the statistical and economic impact of the benefi ts 
factor (Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993). 
  3.  This argument relies on empirical research that questions whether the dual in-
ternal labor market exists. Full-time employees may not believe managers who 
claim temporary workers are not competing for the same jobs (Abraham and 
Taylor 1996). 
  4.  The major exception is dismissal based on discrimination such as gender or race 
discrimination.
 5. While the distinction between core and periphery workers is intuitive, some em-
pirical evidence questions whether employing contingent workers actually pro-
vides any buffer against involuntary turnover among permanent workers (Capelli 
and Neumark 2004). Further research is needed on the effects of employing both 
contingent and permanent workers under different conditions.
  6.   The Black-Scholes model is the most famous example of a mathematical formu-
la to estimate the value of a fi nancial option. The formula takes into account the 
option’s purchase price, exercise date or period, and exercise price. The formula 
also considers the amount of uncertainty about the price of the stock. 
  7.   This is why many executives who received stock options as compensation during 
the Internet stock boom of the late 1990s made so much money.
 8.   For a helpful categorization of real options, see Trigeorgis (1996).
  9.  Also, Abraham (1998) fi nds differences in mean use of staffi ng arrangements 
between fi rms with and without seasonality and cyclicality. 
 10.  The fi rst published paper to apply real options logic to employment decisions 
was Malos and Campion (1995). The authors explain the up-or-out promotional 
systems in professional service fi rms as creating a real option that mitigates un-
certainty about employee productivity.
 11.   We use logistic regression analysis, which allows us to investigate the impact of 
independent variables on the probability that a position is contingent. Logistic 
regression is an extension of standard ordinary least squares analysis that is ap-
propriate when the dependent variable is of a yes/no nature. Technical details and 
tables of results can be obtained from the fi rst author.
 12.  See Chapter 2 of this volume for a more detailed discussion of these three esti-
mates and the CPS defi nition of “alternative work arrangements” as distinct from 
contingent work.
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 13.  By 1999, the numbers had changed slightly to 60.7 percent and 2.9 percent, re-
spectively (DiNatale 2001, Table 6). 
 14.  We report results from our analysis of the 1995 data because little has changed 
over time in the CPS variables employed in this study. 
 15.  Managers and employees make decisions about the duration of a position, the 
compensation for the position, and the attributes of the workers simultaneously. 
To appropriately estimate all the relationships between these variables would 
require a system of equations. However, if employers can choose to save money 
on wages and benefi ts by hiring contingent workers, this choice implies that the 
employers are price takers. 
 16.  Using Estimate 3 of contingent work, with self-employed and independent con-
tractors included and the time frame restriction removed, those workers with 
some graduate work are 12 percent more likely than other workers to be contin-
gent. Well-educated people are apparently more likely to start their own busi-
nesses. 
 17.  In fact, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that aggregate measures are superior to 
fi rm-level data at capturing technological risk because shocks should affect all 
industry users of the same technology. 
 18.  Articles discussing theoretical approaches to strategic human resource manage-
ment include Barney and Wright (1998); Gerhart, Trevor, and Graham (1996); 
and Snell, Youndt, and Wright (1996).
 19.  Several researchers have considered whether bundles of human resources prac-
tices are more effective than individual practices at creating value through peo-
ple. Infl uential papers include Youndt et al. (1996); MacDuffi e (1995); Becker 
and Huselid (1998); and Arthur (1992). An interesting and readable study is Up-
ton (1995), in which the author fi nds that fl exible manufacturing requires fl exible 
employees.
 20.  Case studies show that the benefi ts of using contingent-knowledge workers can 
outweigh the costs (MacDougall and Hurst 2005). For a thorough discussion of 
how to use contingent workers to accumulate and disseminate knowledge, see 
Matusik and Hill (1998).
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